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ACCOUNTABLE CARE ORGANIZATIONS: A RESPONSE TO
CRITICAL VOICES
WasifAli Khan, Esq.*

ABSTRACT
The Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act creates the Shared
Savings Program aimed at promoting accountability for a patient
population, coordinating items under Medicare Part A and B, and
encouraging investment in infrastructureand redesigned care processes.'
The Shared Savings Program will give Accountable Care Organizations
(ACOs) a share in any savings generated by incentivizing the reduction of
healthcarecosts associatedwith inefficiencies in and the ineffectiveness of
the current healthcare delivery system. ACOs are expected to generate
significant savings by requiring compliance with quality measures and
healthcareinfrastructuredevelopment.
This article advocates the speedy acceptance of ACOs as an
innovative, profitable model of reducing healthcare costs. Section 1
provides background information on ACOs and the Shared Savings
Program by discussing what an ACO is, what the Shared Savings Program
is, and what the Center for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS)
expects from an A CO. In Section 2, the paper highlights some of the
criticisms directed at A COs, and responds to those criticisms in Section 3.
Finally, this paper reaches the conclusion that despite the criticisms, the
Shared Savings Program and CMS-sanctioned ACOs can be a success,
and urges providers who are consideringjoining an ACO to stop wasting
time.

I would like to thank Professor Freeman Farrow, a mentor for whom I have an immeasurable amount of
respect, for his incredible support while I wrote this article. In addition, I would like to thank Fatema
Zanzi, Christopher Anderson and Feroze Khan for conversations that spurred some of the ideas present
in this article. Finally, I would like to thank my wife, Nada Gomaa, for being incredibly patient with me
during this process.
1. Pub. L. 111-148; See Also, 42 U.S.C.A. 1395jjj (2011).
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SECTION 1: BACKGROUND INFORMATION
What is an Accountable Care Organization?
ACOs are talked about frequently these days. Many commentators
argue that they will (and should) be the new model for healthcare service
delivery, while others suggest that they are not a viable model for the
societal structure in America.2 While the arguments on each side are
compelling and very interesting, they are little more than passionate
rhetoric and catchy phrases unless we know what an ACO is, and what is
its intent. So, what is an ACO? In the early 1970s Dr. Elliot Fisher from
Dartmouth Medical School led the Dartmouth Atlas Project.3 The
Dartmouth Atlas project thoroughly researched and documented variations
in medical care across the United States.' The project's findings indicated
that there was a wide variation in healthcare costs across the United States,
and more importantly, that higher spending per patient does not equate to
better outcomes for patients.' In an effort to explain the anomaly, Dr.
Fisher coined the term Accountable Care Organization to reflect an
organization, virtual or otherwise, that provided accountability across the
medical care spectrum.6 Given its design, it comes as no surprise that this
new model has become an integral part of the future of American
healthcare reform.
Ideally, an ACO is a healthcare delivery and cost-control model
aimed at combining provider payment and delivery system reforms to
deliver cost-effective care.' Whereas prior healthcare reform measures
have been sidetracked and derailed by the "chicken or the egg"
conundrum,'-there was a general disagreement on whether the provider
payment system or the delivery system should be addressed before the
other'-an ACO avoids it altogether. The ACO model, by combining the
two reforms, attempts to eradicate the "chicken or the egg" problem.
Harold Miller, president and CEO for the Network for Regional
2. See discussion infra Section Two.
3. Jordan T. Cohen, A Guide to Accountable Care Organizationsand Their Role in the Senate's Health
Reform Bill, (March 11, 2010), http://www.healthreformwatch.com/2010/03/1 /a-guide-to-accountablecare-organizations-and-their-role-in-the-senates-health-reform-bill/.
4. Id.
5. Id.
6. Id.
7. Kelly Devers & Robert Berenson, Can Accountable Care Organizations Improve the Value of Health
Care by Solving the Cost and Quality Quandaries?, Urban Institute at 1 (2009),
http://www.urban.org/UploadedPDF/411975_acountable-care_orgs.pdf.
8. Id.
9. Id.
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Healthcare Improvement, describes an ACO best by equating it to buying
a TV."o He invokes the example of Sony, which combines the multiple
component parts of a TV to sell individuals a whole TV." Similarly, he
states that an ACO combines the component parts of medical care
(including primary care, specialists, hospitals, and home healthcare) to
give people a complete "TV" rather than individual parts. Currently, we
are accustomed to seeking out the component parts ourselves.12
Ultimately, an ACO is a network of doctors and healthcare providers
from across the medical spectrum that share responsibility for efficiently
providing quality medical care to patients." ACO proponents have
identified the following three characteristics as essential elements of an
ACO: (1) the ability to provide, and mange with patients, the continuum of
care across different institutional settings, including ambulatory and
inpatient hospital care, and possibly post acute care; (2) the capability of
prospectively planning budgets and resource needs; and (3) sufficient size
to support comprehensive, valid, and reliable performance measurement.14
The multiple industry definitions of an ACO are closely aligned with the
government's expectations of a Center for Medicare and Medicaid
Services ("CMS")-sanctioned ACO. CMS expects an ACO to be a legal
entity that is recognized and authorized under state, federal, or tribal law
and comprised of an eligible group of ACO participants" that work
together to manage and coordinate care for Medicare fee-for-service
beneficiaries.
What are the Goals of an ACO?
The ultimate goal of having the ACO model is to provide quality
medical care efficiently and effectively.'" This goal is accomplished "by
focusing on the needs of patients and linking payment rewards to
outcomes."" As highlighted by the Patient Protection and Affordable Care
2011)
18,
Care Organizations, Explained, (January
Accountable
Gold,
10. Jenny
http://www.kaiserhealthnews.org/stories/2011 /january/1 3/aco-accountable-care-organization-faq.aspx.
11. Id.
12. Id
13. Cohen, supra note 2.
14. Id See also, Gold, supra note 10.
15. 76 Fed. Reg. 67,802, 67,973 (Nov. 2, 2011) (to be codified at 42 CFR §425.20).
16. Healthcare.gov., Accountable Care Organizations: Improving Care Coordinationfor People with
2011),
31,
(March
Medicare
updated
(last
http://www.healthcare.gov/news/factsheets/2011/03/accountablecare0331201 la.html
November 16, 2011).
17. U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, Affordable Care Act to Improve Quality of Carefor
31,
2011),
(March
Release
Press
HHS
Medicare,
with
People
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Act ("PPACA"), the CMS-sanctioned ACO must, in regards to quality
improvement, include provisions to increase value-based purchasing."
Value-based purchasing requires linking provider payment directly with
quality of care by rewarding providers for delivering high-quality efficient
clinical care." Accordingly, one of the main goals or purposes of the
Shared Savings Program is to reduce healthcare costs by placing a focused
emphasis on reducing excess expenditures and applying cost-saving
redesigned care processes all while maintaining the quality of care.20
Who Can Participate in an ACO in the Shared Savings Program?
CMS enumerated a list of individuals in the proposed rules that it
sees as playing a critical role in establishing the ACO as a viable model for
achieving efficiency in healthcare services delivery. 2 1The list includes: (1)
professionals in group practice arrangements, (2) partnerships or joint
ventures between hospitals and "ACO Professionals,"22 (3) hospitals
employing "ACO Professionals," and (4) other groups of providers of
services and suppliers as the Health and Human Services (HHS) secretary
("Secretary") sees fit. 23 Other providers such as Federally Qualified
Health Centers (FQHCs), Rural Health Centers (RHCs), Critical Access
Hospitals (CAHs), long-term care hospitals, Skilled Nursing Facilities
(SNFs), and nursing homes are included in the final rule as eligible
participants.24 However, the Secretary has the discretion to narrow or
expand the list of eligible providers.2 5
Specifically, for FQHCs and RHCs, the government lacked the
specific data (service codes, physician, specialty, specific attribution of
services to a rendering healthcare professional) to assign beneficiaries or
determine the expenditures during the three-year benchmark period.26
CMS requires FQHCs and RHCs participating in an ACO to identify
http://www.hhs.gov/news/press/2011pres/03/20110331a.html.
18. 76 Fed. Reg. 19528, 19530 (April 7, 2011).
19. Id.
20. HHS Press Release, supra note 17.
21. 42 CFR § 425.102 (2011).
22. 76 Fed. Reg. 67,802, 67,973 (Nov. 2, 2011) (to be codified at 42 CFR §425.20) (defining "ACO
Professionals" as physicians, physician assistants, nurse practitioners, or clinical nurses).
23. 42 CFR § 425.102 (2011).
24. Id. See also 76 Fed. Reg. 19538 (April 7, 2011) (Although, they were not specifically designated as
eligible providers under the proposed rules because their unique claims billing systems, payment
methodologies, and data-reporting requirements are not compatible with the Shared Savings Program's
requirements and would pose additional challenges to the ACO model).
25. 76 Fed. Reg. 19538 (April 7, 2011).
26. Id.
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physicians who provide primary care services.2 7 CAHs that adjust their
billing methods to bill for both the facility and the professional service will
also be eligible to participate according to the final rules.28
How Does a CMS-Sanctioned ACO Function?
Industry experts understand an ACO to be a legal organization
capable of receiving shared savings and disbursing those savings to its
members.29 CMS envisions a similar structure for ACOs.3 0 After
soliciting comments in the November 17, 2010 Federal Register, CMS
proposed a two-track hybrid model that combines cost-savings with loss
allocation." The final rules as established by CMSndicate that sanctioned
ACOs will have the opportunity to participate in cost-saving measures by
voluntarily electing one of two models for the initial mandatory three-year
agreement.32 Track One is a model best suited for ACOs that are not yet
able to share in the risks." Under Track One, ACOs would not be
responsible for any portion of the losses above the benchmark.34
Under Track 2, ACOs that are ready to share in the losses with
greater opportunity for reward can elect to immediately enter the twosided risk-sharing arrangement.35 Participants in Track Two are eligible
for higher sharing rates than those in the one-sided model.36
Governance and Operational Requirements of an ACO
The Shared Savings Program recognizes that a change in the
American healthcare system is not achieved simply by "fixing" physicians.
The change to quality-driven healthcare that the Shared Savings Program
emphasizes requires an institution-wide change. Consequently, the Shared
Savings Program imposes strict governance and operational requirements
on ACOs. Eligible ACOs must have a governing body that can be held
27. 42 CFR §425.404.
28. 42 CFR § 425.102. This would require CAHs to bill according to method II as mentioned in 42 CFR
413.70(b)(3).
29. Fisher, et al., FosteringAccountable Healthcare: Moving Forwardin Medicine, 28 HEALTH AFF. 219 ,
219-220 (2009).
30. 42 CFR §425.104.
31. 76 Fed. Reg. 19603 (April 7, 2011).
32. 42 CFR §425.600(a)(1)-(2).
33. 76 Fed. Reg. 19603 (April 7, 2011).
34. Compare 76 Fed. Reg, 19603 (April 7, 2011) and 42 CFR § 425.604 (The final regulations do not
contain loss calculation method for Track 1 ACOs).
35. 76 Fed. Reg. 19603 (April 7, 2011).
3 6. Id.
37. 42 CFR §425.106.
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accountable for implementing specific processes aimed at improving the
quality of medical care, such as promoting evidence-based medicine,
reporting on quality and cost measures, and coordinating care amongst
ACO members." Aside from maintaining responsibility for oversight and
strategic planning," an ACO governing body must have a fiduciary duty to
the ACO,4 0 must provide for meaningful representation and participation
of ACO members,4 1 and must be free of conflicts of interest.42
Appropriate ACO management structures will align administrative
and clinical systems to promote better individual and population healthcare
and lower growth in healthcare expenditures.4 3 The clinical aspect of the
ACO must be managed by a state-licensed physician that is a participant
within that ACO and who is physically present at an ACO office or
clinical location on a regular basis." In addition to requiring the clinical
director/manager to be an active participant to the ACO, the Shared
Savings Program requires each participating doctor to commit to the
ACO.45 Individual ACO providers/suppliers can show commitment by
providing a sufficient amount of financial or human investment to ensure
they remain motivated ACO participants.46 Commitment can also be
shown by agreeing to abide by mandatory ACO processes and being held
accountable for meeting the ACO's performance standards for these
processes.47 Mandatory ACO processes include processes that promote
evidence-based medicine,4 8 promote patient-engagement,4 9 develop an
internal quality and cost reporting mechanism that allows for feedback and
evaluation of ACO participants,so and coordinate care among ACO
participants."
Allocation of Savings/Losses
The main crux of the ACO Shared Savings Program is providing an
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.

Id.
Id. at 106(b).
Id. at 106(b)(3).
Id. at 106(c).
42 CFR § 106(d).
42 CFR § 425.108(a).
Id. at 108(c).
Id. at 108(d).
Id. at 108(d)(1).
Id. at § 425.108(d)(2).
42 C.F.R.§ 425.112(b)(1).
Id. at §425.112(b)(2).
Id. at §425.112(b)(3).
Id. at §425.112(b)(4).
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incentive to participate in cost savings achieved by reducing expenditures.
ACOs will be eligible to receive a portion of shared savings only if the
estimate average per capita expenditures for Medicare Part A and B
services for beneficiaries is a certain percentage below a benchmark
established by the Secretary.52 The percentage amount, called the
"minimum savings rate," will take into account the number of fee-forservice Medicare beneficiaries in the ACO.53 CMS will determine the
Minimum Savings Rate for a Track One ACO using a sliding scale based
on the number of beneficiaries it serves.54 For a Track Two ACO, the
Minimum Savings Rate will be two percent." The benchmark will be
updated each year of the agreement period based on the flat dollar
equivalent of the projected annual growth in national expenditures for
Medicare Part A and Part B expenditures." If a Track One ACO meets the
quality performance standards set by the Secretary, it can recover up to
fifty percent of all savings under the benchmark." This sharing rate is
subject to a cap, which places a limit on the total amount of shared savings
payable to an ACO. The cap for a Track One ACO will be ten percent of
its individual benchmark." A Track Two ACO can recover up to sixty
percent of savings generated, with a cap of recovering no more than fifteen
percent of its total benchmark." Similarly, costs incurred above and
beyond the benchmark are considered losses, and will be allocated to
similar percentage figures. 0
Performance and Quality Measures Under the Shared Savings
Program
Section 1899(b)(3)(A) of PPACA requires the Secretary to determine
appropriate measures to assess quality performance of an ACO. In
keeping with this duty, CMS' proposed rules on the Shared Savings
Program listed sixty-five measures to establish quality standards that must
be met in order to qualify for shared savings for the first performance
period." Under the proposed rules, quality measures for subsequent
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.

42 C.F.R. § 425.602.
Id.
42 C.F.R. § 425.604(b).
Id. at § 425.606(b).
Id. at §425.602.
Id. at § 425.604(d).
Id.
42 C.F.R.§ 425.606.
Id.
76 Fed. Reg. 67802-01, 67871 (November 2, 2011).
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performance measures would have been released in future rulemaking.62
Many commenters suggested that CMS adopt a lower number of
performance measures that are aligned with the goals of the Shared
Savings Program. In the final rules, CMS reduced the number of quality
measures from sixty-five to thirty-three measures across four domains.'
Care
are: Patient/Caregiver Experience,
The four domains
Coordination/Patient Safety, Preventative Health, and At-Risk
Populations.6' ACOs will submit data to support their success in these
quality measures through one of four ways: (1) patient surveys; (2) claims
filed with CMS; (3) Electronic Health Record (EHR) Incentive Program
Reporting; and (4) the Group Practice Reporting Option (GPRO) web
interface.66 The final rule is modified to score only reports of data in these
measures for the first year (pay for reporting), and will phase in
performance during years two and three (pay for performance).6 ' The
GPRO interface is an option in the Physician Quality Reporting System
(PQRS), and provides an incentive to group practices for reporting on
performance measures under the PQRS initiative." The PQRS initiative
provides physicians who service Medicare beneficiaries with an incentive
payment if they properly report on certain quality measures for certain
covered services.
ACO Models Under the CMS Shared Savings Program
Under CMS' proposed rules, an ACO can exist in a number of forms.
Research indicates that there are at least five different viable models for an
ACO to be in compliance with CMS."o The provision of quality medical
care for serious illness requires coordinated longitudinal care and the
engagement of multiple professionals across multiple institutional
settings." The most serious gaps in the efficient provision of quality
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. Id. at 67889.
65. Id. at 67889-90.
66. 76 Fed.Reg. 67889-90 (November 2, 2011).
67. Id at 67891.
68. Group Practice Reporting Option, CENTERS FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVICES,
https://www.cms.gov/Medicare/Quality-Initiatives-Patient-AssessmentInstruments/PQRS/GroupPractice ReportingOption.html (last modified November 21, 2011).
69. Physician Quality Reporting System, CENTERS FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVICES,
https://www.cms.gov/PQRS/ (last modified October 17, 2011).
70. Stephen M. Shortell & Lawrence P. Casalino, Accountable Care Systems for Comprehensive Health
http://www.freshat
9,
available
at
2007),
(March,
Care
Reform,
thinking.org/docs/workshop_070301/ShortellCasalinoDeliverySystemModelsRevise9.pdf.
71. Elliot S. Fisher, Creating Accountable Care Organizations: The Extended Hospital Medical Staff 26
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healthcare are a result of poor coordination and faulty transition.72 A
recent Institute of Medicine report noticed the flawed coordination and
transition of healthcare between providers, and called for efforts to foster
shared accountability for quality and cost of care among providers.73
While this call for a higher standard in healthcare delivery is attractive in
theory, practical challenges exist in identifying the appropriate nexus for
shared accountability and responsibility.7 4
Model One - The Extended Medical Staff
The "Extended Medical Staff' model enforces accountability among
hospital[s] and physicians that work in or around them." This model takes
into account the notion that all physicians are directly or indirectly
affiliated with a local acute care hospital, whether through inpatient work
or through care patterns of patients they serve. 76 An ACO under the
Extended Medical Staff model would essentially be a hospital-associated,
multispecialty group practice that is empirically defined by direct or
indirect referral patterns to a hospital. Under this model, patients and
physicians would be assigned to a particular hospital[s]."
Physicians who are inpatient providers are assigned to the hospital
where they do most of their inpatient work. 79 Research indicates that
approximately sixty-two percent of physicians perform inpatient work, and
of those performing inpatient work, sixty percent work only at one
hospital." Of the physicians performing in-patient services at multiple
locations, seventy-five percent of their work is at a primary hospital."
Consequently, of those who do inpatient work, ninety percent or more of
the work is done at the physician's primary hospital.82 For non-inpatient
providers, the model would identify Medicare beneficiaries they served
during the last three-year period, and assign those physicians to the
hospital where the plurality of their Medicare patients were admitted."
(2007) at w44, w45.
Id.
Id.
Id
Fisher, supra note 71 at w45.
Id.
Id.
Id. at w46.
Id at w47.
Fisher, supra note 71 at w47.
Id.
Id.
Id. at w46.

HEALTH AFF., no.1

72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
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Patients would be assigned to the physician, primary or specialty
care, which provides the most amount of care in an ambulatory setting to
that particular patient.8 4 The patient would then be assigned to the hospital
where their physician is assigned." This method of assigning patients
reflects research indicating that Medicare beneficiary care is highly
concentrated within the defined "Extended Medical Staff."" Seventy-two
percent of physician visits for evaluation and management services
("E&M services") and nearly sixty-four percent of admissions are done by
physicians within the "Extended Medical Staff' and primary hospital." If
you consider the primary and secondary hospitals together, the percentage
of E&M services rises to just over seventy-six percent and admission to
nearly eighty-two percent." The overall patterns reveal a high degree of
care concentration, even in rural areas."
A review of the data shows that there is a significant difference
between the best and worst performing "Extended Medical Staff."" The
study used in Dr. Fisher's article divided hospitals and Extended Medical
The study showed that the top quartile,
Staffs into five groups."
consisting of high-performance hospitals with risk-adjusted, one-year
mortality rates, and risk-adjusted, one-year costs in the bottom quartile,
provided better ambulatory care; and preventative screenings, such as
mammography and diabetes screening, are done more consistently in highHigh-performing Extended Medical Staffs
performance hospitals."
showed a lower use of institutional facilities and displayed fewer hospital
discharges, skilled nursing facility discharges, and reimbursable
institutional days.93
This model has a number of advantages that make performance
measurement much easier.9 4 The FULL NAME (IOP) suggests that
performance measurement should include both longitudinal care
(including costs and health outcomes), and measurements that directly
address the current fragmentation of care.95 Aggregating performance
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.

Id.
Fisher,supra note 71 at w46.
Id. at w.48
Id.
Id.
Id.
Fisher,supra note 71 at w49.
Id.
Id.
Id. (All of which indicate a lower institutional admittance rate).
Id.
Fisher, supra note 71 at 52.
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measurements to the level of large physician groups, such as the
"Extended Medical Staff," does exactly that. 96 Under this proposed model,
we can get all the physicians assigned to an Extended Medical Staff and
we can conduct performance measurements that will result in larger
These
sample sizes and a broader scope of potential measures.
that
physicians
all
include
feasibly
could
performance measurements
provide care to a population within the framework of measurements."
Additionally, focusing on the Extended Medical Staff will foster
accountability for care by emphasizing capacity measures." This model
inherently makes the argument that higher healthcare spending is
attributable to a greater use of discretionary supply sensitive services such
as: visits, specialist consultations, tests, imaging, and the use of
institutional, rather than outpatient, settings for care.99 Physicians tend to
adapt their practice to locally available resources, thus, local decisions that
influence capacity-capital investments, physician recruitment, and choice
about practice location-are the first links in the chain leading to an
increase in the quantity of care provided and the overuse of supply
sensitive services."'o The use of performance measures on a large scale
would bring this issue to light, and hopefully decisions to invest in care
management, reduce acute care capacity, reduce unnecessary specialist
recruitment, or to engage in effective management of post acute care
0
Finally, since most
would result in improved quality and lower costs.o'
physicians remain in solo or small practices that lack the capital necessary
to make large investments for implementation of better care management
protocols and health information systems, a large ACO, such as the
Extended Medical Staff, could make those investments.' 02
As effective as this model may seem at providing the necessary largescale investments, performance data, and accountability, there are several
issues that could limit its effectiveness.o' Namely, the older model of
capitated payments (define) has been replaced by fixed-price care.'04 With
doctors getting a lower fee for their services, they tend to perform more
services to offset their losses. The Extended Medical Staff model would
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. Id. at 53.
99. Id.
100. Id.Fisher,supra note 71 at w53.
101. Id. at 53.
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. Id. at 54.
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have to keep this in mind when creating performance measurements to
accurately determine any cost-savings.' Physicians also exhibit a strong
culture of individual responsibility and professional autonomy for the
patients they see, and they may be hesitant to be accountable to patients
within the ACO that they do not personally treat.o' A more practical
concern about large-scale accountability is the highly charged decisionmaking environment.07 Questions arise such as who would make decisions
about data collection, auditing, and deciding what levels of achievement
merit reward?o' Finally, legal obstacles such as how this model would
function under the current antitrust and anti-kickback laws could prevent
the efficiencies often realized under an ACO from ever being realized.'09
Model Two - Multi-Specialty Group

The second model would create ACOs that incorporate and reflect
multi-specialty practice groups. Cite Of the 718,000 practicing physicians
in the United States, between seventeen percent and twenty-six percent are
associated with a multi-specialty group practice of 100 or more
physicians."0 These large multi-specialty group practices present an
opportunity to deliver coordinated care to a defined group of patients."'
Additionally, these large practice groups are more likely to implement and
use healthcare IT and electronic health records, work in collaborative
healthcare teams, and use evidence-based care processes." 2 Multispecialty practice groups are also better situated to provide long-term care
and handle multiple payment methods including related bundled payment,
episodic payment, and capitation."'
In addition to being expensive to create," 4 sometimes the size and
lack of cooperation amongst physicians make large multi-specialty

105. Fisher,supra note 71 at 54.
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. Id
109. Id. (The Department of Justice along with CMS have amended rules pertaining to antitrust provisions
and Stark and Anti-kickback laws, respectively. It remains to be seen whether the proposed changes would
result in the desired efficiency).
110. Lawrence P. Casalino, Physicians and Corporations: A Corporate Transformation of American
Medicine?, 29 J.HEALTH POL'Y, POL. & L. 869 (2004).
111. Stephen M. Shortell & Lawrence P. Casalino, Accountable Care Systems for Comprehensive Health
http://www.freshat
at
9,
available
2007),
(March,
Reform,
Care
thinking.org/docs/workshop070301/ShortellCasalinoDeliverySystemModelsRevise9.pdf.
112. Francis J. Crosson, The delivery System Matters, 24 HEALTH AFF. 1543, 1544 (2005).
113. Shortell, supra note I10, at 10.
114. Id.
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practice groups a difficult practice model."' Additionally, while they have
the capacity and money to hire effective and skilled leadership, the
governance protocols in many multi-specialty practice groups can be
complex and time-consuming due to size and conflicts among the different
specialty groups."' Even if multi-specialty practice groups don't become
the most prevalent model for ACOs they exhibit valued characteristics
such as working on teams and data generation that should be implemented
in ACO models.
Model Three - Hospital Medical Staff Organizations
Hospital Medical Staff Organizations are very similar to the
Extended Medical Staff Model explained above. The ACO would consist
of the hospital and the physicians on its medical staff."' The medical staff
is an area of high physician concentration with an emphasis on developing
professional and referral relationships."' Hospitals have the capacity to
invest in large-scale efficiency projects, generate date on performance,
adopt electronic medical/health record technology, and assist with
providing quality improvement support.'19 Additionally, this model could
respond better to incentives based on specific payment models such as
bundled payments for specific medical conditions or episodic-illness based
payment methods, because these payment models would require the
hospital and medical staff to collaborate at a much higher level.'2 0
Nevertheless, hospital medical staff organizations have historically
faced several problems. Many physicians under these organizations view
the hospital as a competitor for medical services and show general
discomfort with involvement in such large organizations due to the
challenges of reconciling divergent physician interests, long-standing
conflicts between the hospital and physicians, and legal obstacles to gainsharing.12 '
Model Four - Physician Hospital Organization
The Physician-Hospital Organization (PHO) is a variation of the
115.

Lawrence P. Casalino et al., Benefits of and Barriersto Large Medical Practice in the United States,
ARCH.
INTERNAL
MED.
1958,
1961
(2003)
available
at
http://www.ftk.gov/ogethealthcarehearings/docs/030925lawrencebb.pdf.
116. Shortell, supra note 110, at 10.
117. Id. atl.
118. Id.
119. Id.
120 Id
121. Shortell, supra note 110 at 12.
163
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multi-specialty practice group and Hospital Medical Staff Model.' 22
Currently, there are 1,000 PHOs in the United States, and approximately
thirty-seven percent of physicians in the U.S. belong to them. 123 PHO's
will typically involve those members of the medical staff whose economic
interest are best aligned with the hospital; meaning, those physicians that
can provide the hospital with the needed geographic network for
contracting purposes and are the most cost-effective providers. 124 This
model has the ability to manage the cost and quality of care because
hospitals can use cost and quality criteria as standards for membership in
addition to measuring efficiency.125 Hospitals can reevaluate membership
annually to ensure that participating providers will help the hospital
maximize cost-savings and efficiency. 126
In addition to controlling costs, limited membership also restricts the
size and bureaucracy of the organization. 127 This could result in an easier
transfer of information and a better ability to manage change. 128 Despite
the inherent advantages of this double-incentive model, many first
generation PHOs have failed. 129 PHOs require significant clinical
integration and raise significant antitrust concerns.' And with the FTC's
past success in bringing cases against PHOs that, while not clinically
integrated, were trying to negotiate contracts with health plans that did not
involve risk-sharing by physicians and hospitals, legal concerns about an
integrated model involving hospital and physician risk sharing are to be
expected."'
Model Five - Health Plan Provider and Interdependent Physician
Organizations
The Health Plan-Provider Organization and the Interdependent
Physician Organization are interesting ACO models. A Health PlanProvider Organization would aggregate ACO physicians based on the
health plans they service.'32 The deep pockets of the health plan could
122. Id.
123. Id
124. Id.
125. Denis Cortese & Robert Smoldt, Taking Steps Towards Integration,26 HEALTH AFF. w70 (2007).
126. Shortell, supranote I10, at 12-13.
127. Id.
128. Id.
129. Id.
130. Id.
131. Lawrence P. Casalino, The FederalTrade Commission, Clinical Integration,and the Organizationof
Physician Practice,31 J. HEALTH POL'Y, POL. & L. 569-568 (2006).
132. Shortell, supranote 110 at 14.
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provide a significant boost to necessary capital-heavy investments such as
overhauls of electronic medical/health record systems and quality
improvement/care-management systems.' 3 Some health plans already
have developed capabilities in the area of electronic medical record
systems.134 However, while they can manage data and provide technical
assistance, these health plans can only have a limited impact on care
management and changes in physician practices.' 35 A Health PlanProvider Organization ACO model would need leadership from local
physicians, who may or may not possess adequate leadership skills.136
Interdependent Physician Organizations are a variation on currently
Interdependent
existing Independent Physician Organizations.'
Physician Organizations, however, have a stronger governance structure,
shared knowledge capabilities, and enough patients to support
investment.'
Regardless of which models ACOs falls under, they generally need
three things to succeed: information, infrastructure, and incentive.' 39 The
success of any model, as the Institute of Medicine highlights, relies on a
national performance measurement system.'40 National performance
measurement systems and evidence-based medicine allow for a multidisciplinary group of physicians, engineers, researchers, and managers to
continually identify areas of improvement and rapidly spread those to
ACOs across the country.141
SECTION TWO: ANALYSIS
Criticisms of ACOs
ACOs have the potential to trigger a massive shift in healthcare
delivery in the United States. However, critics wonder if they can really
improve the value of healthcare. Despite significant modifications and
changes from the proposed rules to the final rules, critics remain skeptical
of whether ACOs will receive a warm welcome by the healthcare
community and whether ACOs can actually deliver on the promise of a
133.
134.
135.
136.
137.
138.
139.
140.
141.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 15.
Id.
Shortell, supranote I10 at 13.
Id. at 14.
Victor R. Fuchs, Health Care ExpendituresReexamined, 143 ANN. INTERNAL MED. 76, 77 (2005).
Institute of Medicine, PerformanceMeasurement:Accelerating Improvement (2006).
Id.
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reformed system.14 2 The crux of the commentary seems to be focused on
three main areas of concern: complexities and costs of reporting
requirements; internal coordination; and the external impact ACOs may
have on the healthcare market and whether ACOs can actually deliver on
the promise of a reformed system.
Reporting Complexities and Costs
The original proposed rules were called a bureaucratic nightmare and
commentators found the need to report on sixty-five quality measures to be
quite intrusive and burdensome.' 4 3 The final rules adjusted the reporting
requirements in the proposed rules by reducing them to thirty-three
measures.'" Yet, thirty-three separate reporting requirements spread over
four domains is no easy task.'4 5 The design of the program, including its
reporting requirements, could lead to steep start-up costs averaging around
$1.8 million per ACO.'46 These reporting requirements will require new
data warehouses and substantial staff to manage the process." For an
ACO consisting of a 200-bed hospital, 80 primary care physicians and 150
specialists, it would have to spend at least $75,000 in reporting
requirement related start-up costs.'48 For a larger five-hospital ACO with
1,200 beds, 250 primary care physicians, and 500 specialists, the average
reporting requirement start-up costs are expected to be at least $100,000.149
Internal Coordination Issues
The high cost of burdensome reporting requirements and the
relatively low financial incentive for the amount of work and internal
adjustment necessary to create a fully-functional ACO led the American
Medical Group Association to declare that the ". . .incentives are too

142. John Cummins, ACOs Seen as Tough Sell, Despite Concessions, HEALTHLEADERS MEDIA (October
24, 2011), http://www.healthleadersmedia.com/content/LED-272403/ACOs-Seen-As-Tough-Sell-DespiteConcessions## (follow article to page 2 link).
143. Robert Samuelson, How NOT to Control health Costs, WASHINGTON POST (June 7, 2011),
m/blogs/post-partisan/post/how-not-to-control-healthhttp://www.washingtonpost.co
spending/2011/06/07/AGrnjDLH blog.html?hpid-z3.
144. 76 Fed Reg 67,889 (November 2, 2011).
145. Id.
146. Ann Wilde Matthews, Health-CareInitiative Draws Fire, WALL STREET JOURNAL (June 3, 2011),
http://online.wsj.com/ article/SB100 01424052702303654804576349794068956906.htrnl.
147. Keith D. Moore, The Work Ahead: Activities and Costs to Develop an Accountable Care
2011),
(April,
10
CONSULTING,
MCMANIS
Organization,
http://www.mcmanisconsulting.com/pdfs/Cost-of Developing.ACOWhitePaper.pdf
148. Id. at 13.
149. Id. at 16.
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difficult to achieve to make this voluntary achievement attractive."'s The
internal coordination issues primarily relate to coordination between ACO
participants and, on a moral level, between the types of patients an ACO
participant treats.
A primary example of physician coordination revolves around
physician autonomy. ACOs create a rather unique situation for physicians,
who are taught that medicine is an interaction between an individual
physician and an individual patient.'' ACOs need to give physicians the
room to work and achieve the best results in the diverse clinical settings
they face today.'52 Historically, physicians have proven inept when it
comes to working together in large numbers-nearly seventy-five percent
of office-based physicians, representing nearly ninety-five percent of all
U.S. practices, work in groups of five or fewer physicians.'
Additionally, ACOs are expected to promote and implement the use
of Electronic Health Records (EHR), however, ACO participants may be
using different EHR software.' In hospital-run ACOs, it is likely that the
participating physicians will have to switch over to the hospital's EHR
software.' These coordination issues pale in comparison to the issue of
splitting profits. Ideally, an ACO participant (primary care physician or
specialist) uses the financial incentives to generate savings, which in turn
create profits for the ACO. Cite How can we expect physicians to be
honest about the value they bring to an ACO? Because much of the profits
generated by an ACO will be from the shared savings, does a physician
determine his portion by counting the number of tests or scans he didn't
order?'
ACOs present a larger philosophical and moral question that remains
unanswered. The classical version of the Hippocratic Oath states, "I will
apply dietetic measures for the benefit of the sick according to my ability
and judgment; I will keep them from harm and injustice."'" With the
150. American Medical Group Association, Letter on Medicare Shared Savings Program, (May 11, 2011).
151. Tom Walsh, Balancing Physician Autonomy with Team-Based ACO Models, MASSACHUSETrS
MEDICAL
SOCIETY,
(April
2011),
http://www.massmed.org/AM/Template.cfm?Section=Home6&TEMPLATE=/CM/ContentDisplay.cfn&C
ONT ENTID =51821.
152. Id.
153. Robert Kocher, MD & Nikhil R. Sahni, Physicians Versus Hospitals as Leaders ofAccountable Care
Organizations,363 NEw ENG. J.MED. 2579, 2580 (2010).
154. Robert Rowley, MD, More About ACOs: Care Coordination, PRACTICE FUSION, (April 21, 2011),
http://www.practicefu sion.com/ehrbloggers/2011/04/more-about-acos-care-coordination.html.
155. Id.
156. Kocher, supra note 152, at 2580.
157. Peter
Tyson,
The
Hippocratic
Oath
Today,
PBS,
(March
27,
2001),
Edelstein,
The
(citing
Ludwig
http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/nova/body/hippocratic-oath-today.html
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requirement to protect the sick by applying their skill and judgment and
the requirement to be just, how do physicians treat an ACO patient
compared to a non-ACO patient? If motivated by the wrong reasons,
namely greed, a physician may tend to over-test and over-treat the nonACO patient, and under-treat and under-test the ACO patient.
External Impact of the ACO
Undoubtedly, bringing together hospitals, primary care physicians,
specialists, and other suppliers/providers under one umbrella is bound to
create issues. Aside from the internal problems created by the ACO
healthcare delivery model, it seems unavoidable for ACOs to experience
some external issues as well. External issues relate directly to how an
ACO, once formed, will interact with other non-ACO healthcare
providers, and whether it runs afoul of longstanding laws and government
policy affecting its operation.
After PPACA was passed, the movement toward healthcare provider
consolidation into ACOs raised antitrust concerns among commentators,
mainly that consolidation may lead to increased prices and defeat the spirit
of lowering healthcare costs.'
While the Shared Savings Program rules
were being written, CMS administrators recognized the potential for
manipulation noting that healthcare entities could reorganize to call
themselves ACOs and use the new clout to raise prices against
consumers.' 59 Of particular concern is the potential impact of ACOs on
solo practitioners and small group practices that cannot make the
necessary investment to join an ACO.'60 Some argue that ACOs will result
in the extinction of community-based solo practices and the crowding out
of smaller hospitals and independent physicians ultimately resulting in
decreased competition and lessened innovation.16 '
Besides antitrust concerns, ACOs raise significant Medicare fraud
and abuse issues. The type of coordination and consolidation needed to
operate an ACO implicates the Stark Law and the Anti-kickback Statutethe primary mechanisms for limiting fraud and abuse. Cite ACOs are

HippocraticOath: Text, Translation,and Interpretation(1943)).
158. Merrill Goozner, Monopolies Threaten Healthcare Cost Controls, THE FISCAL TIMES (February 3,
efiscaltimes.com/Articles/2011/02/03/Monopolies-Threaten-Health-Care-Cost2011),
http://www.th
Controls.aspx#pagel.
159. Id.
160. Update - Accountable Care Organizations, HEALTH AFFAIRS, (August 13, 2010),
http://www.healthaffairs.org/healthpoli cybriefs/brief.php?brief id=23.
161. Randall S. Bock, How an ACO Will Effect the Relationship Between a Doctor and a Patient,
KEVINMD.COM, http://www.kevinmd.com/blog/2011/05/aco-affect-relationship-doctor-patient.html.
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structured to "achieve the efficiency and quality gains of formally
integrated delivery systems (Geisinger, Mayo Clinic) through contractbased aggregation of providers." 6 2 This type of structure calls into
question the ability of a "virtual organization" to meet the integration
requirements of PPACA without running afoul of laws prohibiting
physician self-referral (Stark) and kickbacks (Anti-kickback Statute).6 3
The Stark Law prohibits a physician who has a direct or indirect
financial relationship with an entity, or who has an immediate family
member who has a direct or indirect financial relationship with an entity,
from making a referral to that entity for the furnishing of designated health
services paid for by Medicare.'" ACOs will require referrals between
individuals that are tied together in a financial relationship. Financial
relationships, as defined by Stark Law, include direct or indirect
ownership, investment, or compensation arrangements.165 An ACO is
supposed to be a legal entity capable of distributing shared savings
payments to its members. 6 6 Clearly, the two need to be reconciled.
We need to consider how valid the aforementioned concerns are and
whether they are significant enough to abandon what could be a
monumental change in healthcare delivery in the United States.
Critics' Concerns are Over-Exaggerated or Miss the Point
Altogether
Discourse is important. It stimulates discussion and forces society to
think seriously about policy choices. Thus far, ACO critics have done a
However, their concerns are
great job of stimulating discussion.
drastically overstated and exaggerated. The Medicare Shared Savings
Program itself, Office of Inspector General, Department of Justice, and
Center for Medicaid and Medicare Services waivers, and other regulations
mitigate if not eradicate some concerns altogether.
Reporting Requirements are Easy to Satisfy and will Facilitate
ACO Success
Many critics are apprehensive about the reporting requirements,
162. John V. Jacobi, ACOs: OIG Guidance, CMS Regulations, and Interpretive Tasks, HEALTH REFORM
2011), http://www.healthreformwatch.com/2011/04/05/acos-oig-guidance-cmsWATCH (April 5,
regulations-and-interpretive-tasks/.
163. Id.
164. 42 CFR § 411.353(a).
165. 42 CFR § 411. 354(a)(1)(i)-(ii).
166. 42 CFR § 425.104.
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stating that they will be overly burdensome, and prohibit the success of
ACOs.' 7 In response to the overwhelming comments to the proposed
rules, CMS has reduced the number of quality measures from sixty-five
over five domains to thirty-three over four domains."' Will the reporting
requirements really overburden ACO participants? The answer is no. The
thirty-three measures will get reported to CMS through the following four
methods: (1) patient surveys; (2) EHR (Full name) Incentive Program
Reporting; (3) the GPRO (Group Practice Reporting Option) web
interface; and, (4) claims filed with CMS.'69
Of the four domains being tested, the Patient/Caregiver Experience
domain is the only one that requires its performance measures to be
assessed via a survey.'70 CMS believes that the survey should be based on
the Consumer Assessment of Healthcare Providers and Systems model
because no survey model currently exists for ACO assessment."' For the
years 2012 and 2013, CMS will fund the survey portion of the reporting
requirements for ACOs.17 2 Starting in 2014, ACOs will have to pay for
and conduct their own surveys, but CMS will make this much easier by
providing a number of CMS-certified vendors to conduct the survey." 3
ACO participants have a preapproved survey model to use, will receive
funding in 2012 and 2013 to conduct it, and starting in 2014 can outsource
the survey to a certified vendor-it doesn't get easier than that.
A number of data measures overlap with the data measures used in
the EHR Incentive Program found in the Health Information Technology
for Economic and Clinical Health Act (HITECH Act).'74 As originally
submitted, the proposed rules had twenty-two reporting requirements that
were identical to the HITECH Act's EHR Incentive Program."' In fact,
one of the data measures in the ACO final rules specifically takes into
account how many ACO primary care physicians qualify for an incentive
payment under the EHR Incentive Program.'
167. Samuelson, supranote 142.
168. 76 Fed. Reg. 67889 (November 2, 2011).
169. Id. at 67889-90.
170. Id.
171. Id. at 67891.
172. 76 Fed. Reg. 67891 (November 2, 2011)
173. Id.
174. Compra 76 Fed. Reg. 19571-19591(HER Incentive Program) with 75 Fed. Reg. 44315 (HITECH
Meaningful Use Rules).
175. Amy K. Fehn, The Importance of Health Information Technology for Accountable Care
at
2011
Spec.
Ed.),
Available
HEALTH
ESOURCE
(June,
Organizations, ABA
http://www.americanbar.org/newsletter/publications/aba-health-esource-home/aba-healthlawesource_1
106 aco fehn.html.
176. 76 Fed. Reg. at 67889 (November 2, 2011).

2012]

ACCOUNTABLE CARE ORGANIZATIONS

329

A substantial amount'" of ACO reporting will also be done via the
Group Practice Reporting Option (GPRO) web interface.'
The GPRO
reporting medium will be an upgraded version of the GPRO tool currently
used in the Physician Quality Reporting System (PQRS).'" In the
proposed rules, CMS mentioned its intent to develop the GPRO tool to
interface with EHR technology, so that EHR data could directly fill in
GPRO quality measures.8 o Moving forward, CMS is aiming to increase
reporting efficiency for ACO participants by reducing redundancy. While
ACO participants cannot take advantage of both the Shared Savings
Incentive and the PQRS incentive,'"' CMS has built in a smaller PQRS
incentive in the Shared Savings Program.'8 2 For physicians already
participating in the PQRS initiative, ACO participation is a smart choice.
The physicians get to earn a PQRS initiative, albeit a smaller one, while
potentially earning a Shared Savings Initiative without having to
drastically change data-reporting activities.
Of the thirty-three reporting measures in the final rules, three
measures will be satisfied by data submitted through CMS claims.'8 3
These measures focus on patient readmissions for all conditions and
ambulatory sensitive admissions for congestive heart failure and chronic
obstructive pulmonary disease.'84 The data for these measures will be
gathered by claims submitted for the respective services and do not require
any additional reporting on the ACO's part.' Besides satisfying reporting
requirements, CMS claims can provide ACOs with critical information
necessary to ACO success under the Shared Savings Program." ACOs
will need to complete a Data Usage Agreement (DUA) and submit a
formal request to access claims data, which they can do on a monthly
basis.'87 The availability of such claims data will only help the ACO in
177. Id. (22 of 33 Reporting Measures).
178. 76 Fed. Reg. at 67889-90 (November 2, 2011).
179. 76 Fed. Reg. 19592 (April 7, 2011) (The PQRS is a system originally authorized to provide financial
incentives for eligible professionals who satisfactorily report on a designated set of quality measures. The
2011 PQRS Final Rule can be found at 75 Fed. Reg. 73169 (January 11, 2011)).
180. 76 Fed. Reg. 19593 (April 7, 2011).
181. 42 CFR §425.504(a)(4)
182. 42 CFR §425.504(a)(5).
183. 76 Fed. Reg. 67889 (November 2, 2011).
184. Id.
185. Melanie Phelps, ACO Proposed Rule Review- Part 10. Quality and Performance, (May 6, 2011),
http://www.ncmedsoc.org/blog/index.php/archives/1 1284.
186. 42 CFR § 425.704 (ACOs can request access to beneficiary identifiable claims data for preliminary
prospective assigned beneficiaries and other beneficiaries who receive primary care services from an ACO
participant upon whom assignment is based during the agreement period).
187. 42 CFR §425.704(a).
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tweaking its policies and procedures to ensure maximum efficiency and
quality in the delivery of coordinated care. Beneficiaries reserve the right
to opt-out of data sharing,'"' and they will be notified in writing of how the
ACO will use the information.'89
Most Internal ACO Concerns are Easily Resolved
The main internal ACO coordination concerns raised by critics
revolve around physician independence,' 90 division of ACO profits,' 9'
technology integration,'9 2 and disparate treatment between ACO and nonACO patients. Most of these concerns are resolved by referring to the
Shared Savings Program itself or other existing legislation. However, the
disparate treatment of patients is a more difficult issue to resolve.
Physicians have been described as a "track team of individuals rather
than a soccer team"'93 and have grown to enjoy their autonomy. Though
the Shared Savings Program places a heavy emphasis on developing and
promoting evidence-based medicine,'9 4 it does not remove a physician's
ability to make autonomous clinical decisions. On the contrary, some
specialists believe that ACOs will let doctors engage in their practice
without clinical interference because the crux of the cost-control measures
come from better coordination of care and technological improvement.19
CMS requires an ACO governing body to have enough clout to influence
or direct clinical practice "to improve efficiency in processes and
outcomes."'9 6 The American Medical Group Association (AMGA)
indicated that more than 100 member medical groups across the country
are well-positioned to become accountable care organizations.'97 These
organizations already have in place multi-specialty group practices,
partnerships with hospitals, well-functioning clinical information systems,
and established physician leadership."' ACO success is not dependent on
reducing physician clinical autonomy, but rather from adopting protocols
188. 42 CFR §425.708
189. 42 CFR §425.704(d)(2).
190. Walsh, supra note 150.
191. Kocher, supra note 152.
192. Rowley, supranote 153.
193. Walsh, supra note 150.
194. 42 CFR §425.112(a)(1)(i)
195. OrthoSuperSite, Questions Loom Regarding the Future and the Implementation of ACOs, (August
2011), http://www.orthosupersite.com/view.aspx?rid-86531.
196. 42 CFR §425.108(b).
197. Francis J.Crosson, The Accountable Care Organization: Whatever Its Growing Pains, The Concept Is
Too Vitally Important to Fail,30 HEALTH AFF. 1250, 1252 (2011).
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to reduce the growth in Medicare spending.' The AMGA statistics also
indicate that physicians can work together in larger group settings.
Harmony amongst ACO participants will be most important when it
comes to dividing the shared savings. As part of its application, a CMSsanctioned ACO is required to submit documentation describing how it
plans on using any shared savings it generates, including the criteria it will
employ when distributing shared savings to member participants. 200 ACO
participants will not be blindly joining an ACO without first being able to
determine whether the proposed distribution scheme is to their liking. It is
expected that whoever controls the ACO will capture the largest portion of
the shared savings. 201 ACOs can either be physician-run or hospital-run,
and each control model has its own benefits and drawbacks. 202 For
physicians to take control of an ACO they will need to be ready to make
significant investments in EHR technology and infrastructure
development.203 If they don't want to make large capital investments, they
should let hospitals take the lead. Hospitals, on the other hand, must be
willing to sacrifice short-term profit for long-term savings and forego
some profit from admissions and procedures by shifting to an outpatient
care model.2 " When it comes to profits, ACO participants cannot expect a
windfall. Ultimately any profits made will be distributed according to a
pre-established criteria. If, as a potential participant, a physician does not
like the distribution scheme he or she can always participate in another
ACO or not participate in any ACO.
The disparate treatment between ACO and non-ACO patients by
participating providers is a valid concern. 205 in a first-of-its-kind model
program, the Medicare Physician Group Practice Demonstration Project,
the results were mixed.206 The program provided bonuses to the ten
participating groups if they met quality standards and reduced costs. 207
While some groups were able to generate savings, some groups faced
growing healthcare costs for their patient population compared to
199. David Newman, Accountable Care Organizations and the Medicare Shared Savings Program,
Congressional
Research
Service,
(November
4,
2011)
at pg.
18,
available at
https://www.aamc.org/download/161172/data/crsacos.pdf.
200. 42 CFR § 425.204(d)(1).
201. Kocher, supra note 152, at 2580.
202. Id.
203. Id.
204. Id. at 2580-81.
205. Mark Merlis, Health Policy Brief Accountable Care Organizations, ( July 27, 2010),
http://www.healthaffairs.org/healthpolicybriefs/brief.php?brief id=20.
206. Id.
207. Id
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Possible
comparable Medicare beneficiaries in the same area.208
of nonthe
care
manage
to
inability
the
explanations for this result include
enrolled patients and the fact that payment was still on a fee-for-service
basis. 209 This proves that some groups will be more likely to apply CMS
quality standards to all of their patients, while some will be less likely to
treat all patients the same. However, if private payers implemented CMS
equivalent quality standards and bonus payments, providers will be more
likely to apply quality standards and cost-cutting measures evenly. 210
Considering the growing interest in expanding the ACO models to the
private sector-private payers have already started ACOs with their
providers 211 - it may not be a bad idea for private payers to strongly
consider mimicking CMS quality standards and bonus payment
mechanisms.
Waivers Resolve the "Problematic" External Impact of ACOs
ACOs require a significant amount of collaboration and integration in
order to deliver healthcare cost savings.2 12 Health law attorneys indicate
that a number of existing laws are specifically aimed at preventing this
level of integration and collaboration. 213 A main concern has been how
ACOs can function under the preexisting antitrust laws.2 14 Similarly,
"[another] glaring issue affecting all ACOs intending to participate in the
Medicare Sharing Savings Program ("MSSP") include (sic) application of
the current Fraud and Abuse laws that prohibit the fundamental purpose of
the MSSP - distribution of shared savings among hospitals, physicians,
and other individuals and/or entities."2 15 Mindful of these legal obstacles,
208. Id.
209. Id.
210. Merlis, supra note 204.
211. J. Kersten Kraft & Aldo De La Torre, Northern CaliforniaACOto be a Modelfor NationalEfforts, 2
Accountable Care News, No.11, Oct., 2011.
212. Brandi White, ACO ProposedRule Outlines Risks and Rewardsfor Doctors and Hospitals, AAFP
p.m.),
4:28
2011,
11,
(Apr.
BLOG
http://blogs.aafp.org/fpm/noteworthy/entry/acoproposed rule outlines risks.
213. Jesse Berg, Health Law Alert: CMS Issues Proposed ACO Regulations, GRAY PLANT MOOTY LAW
FIRm (April 13, 2011), http://www.gpmlaw.com/resources/newsletters/health-law-alert-cms-issues(ACOs will impact Stark Law, the Anti-Kickback Statute, the Civil
proposed-aco-regulations.aspx.
Monetary Penalty, Anti-Trust laws, and IRS Rules).
214. Melissa Maleske, Accountable Care Organizations May Raise Antitrust Concerns: FTC and DOJ
Issue Guidance on Accountable Care Organizations' Intersection with Antitrust Laws, INSIDE COUNSEL
MAGAZINE (June 2011), available at http://www.insidecounsel.com/2011/06/01/accountable-careorganizations-may-raise-antitrust.
215. Conrad Meyer, Proposed Waiverfor Application of Fraudand Abuse Laws, ABA HEALTH ESOURCE,
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government agencies decided to implement waivers to excuse certain ACO
activities that would seemingly violate these laws. 2 16 The waivers provide
ample protection for ACO activity and will facilitate long-term ACO
success.
"Every contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or
conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce . . . is declared to be
illegal." 2 17 A contract, agreement, or conspiracy to unreasonably restrict
trade that impacts interstate commerce is in violation of the Sherman
Act.218 An ACO involves numerous healthcare providers agreeing to
cooperate and coordinate the delivery of their services, and clearly violates
the Sherman Act. The Department of Justice and the FTC have created a
waiver that will allow CMS-sanctioned ACOs to get around this legal
hurdle.2 19
The final antitrust waiver establishes three main antitrust policies that
the FTC and DOJ will adhere to: (1) use of rule of reason analysis; (2) the
creation of an antitrust safety zone; (3) and an expedited voluntary
antitrust review process for ACOs.22 0 Typically, antitrust laws treat naked
price-fixing 221and market-allocation agreements among competitors as per
se illegal; however, joint price agreements between competitors are
evaluated under the rule of reason if the providers are financially or
clinically integrated.22 2 To withstand an antitrust review under the rule of
reason, an agreement's potential efficiencies must outweigh its potential

anti-competitive effects. 2 23 The FTC and DOJ determined that CMS' ACO
eligibility criteria are more or less aligned with their requirement for
financial or clinical integration.2 24
The FTC and DOJ created an antitrust safety zone for ACOs in which
independent participants do not exceed thirty-percent market share in
common services for each participant's primary service area. 225 Hospitals
216. Joint FTC/DOJ Antitrust Policy,76 Fed. Reg. 67026 (Oct. 28, 2011); CMS/OIG/HHS waivers, 76
Fed. Reg. 67992 (Nov. 2, 2011).
217. 15 U.S.C.§1 (2011).
218. Lee v. Life Ins. Co. of North America, 829 F. Supp. 529, 535 (D.R.I. 1993), af'd, 23 F.3d 14 (1st
Cir.), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 964 (1994).
219. Accountable Care Organizations Participating in the Medicare Shared Savings Program, 76 Fed. Reg.
67026 (Oct. 28, 2011).
220. 76 Fed. Reg. 62027-31 (Oct. 28, 2011).
221. Where the main purpose of an agreement is to fix prices, divide the market, or generally eliminate the
competition.
222. Id. at 62027.
223. Id.
224. Id.
225. Id. at 67028 (The primary service area is the lowest number of zip codes from which an ACO
participant draws seventy-five percent of its patients).
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and ambulatory surgical centers, in order to qualify for the safety zone,
must be non-exclusive members of the ACO. 226 ACOs that exceed the
thirty-percent market share can still qualify for the safety zone, if they
exceed the threshold due to the inclusion of rural providers/participants.22 7
ACOs that have participating members that exceed fifty percent of the
market share (dominant providers) in their Full name (PSA) will qualify
for the safety zone if no other ACO participant provides that service and
the dominant provider participates in the ACO on a non-exclusive basis. 228
For ACOs that do not qualify for the safety zone, the FTC and DOJ
recommend avoiding the following activities: (1) Improper sharing of
competitively sensitive information; (2) preventing private payers from
incentivizing patients to choose certain providers through contractual
clauses; (3) tying sales 229 ; (4) entering into exclusive contracts with ACO
participants; and, (5) preventing private payers from disseminating
information to their beneficiaries on the efficiency and quality of the

ACO.230

The antitrust waivers are reasonably tailored to promote ACO growth
and success without significant market monopolization. Specifically, the
thirty-percent market share ceiling for the safety zone ensures that an ACO
cannot become too large so as to prevent independent solo practitioners
from being able to compete in the marketplace. The rural and dominant
provider exceptions require the rural participant or the participant with a
dominant market share to be a non-exclusive member of the ACO.
Similarly, hospitals and ambulatory surgical centers must be non-exclusive
members of ACOs. Cite This proves that the spirit behind ACO
participation is to create an efficient healthcare delivery model, not to
eliminate independent physician practices or reduce healthcare costs
through market dominance. Solo practitioners in many communities are
banding together to form IPAs (Independent Physician Associations),23 1
and they can continue to do that to combat any perceived ACO threat.
To resolve legal concerns over ACOs' implication of the Medicare
fraud and abuse laws, CMS, the OIG, and HHS have issued waiver
guidelines for ACOs to protect them from violating the Physician SelfReferral Law (Stark), the Anti-kickback Statute (AKS), and the Civil

226.
227.
228.
229.
230.
231.

76 Fed. Reg. 67028-29 (Oct. 28, 2011).
Id. at 62029 (Rural hospitals must participate in the ACO on a non-exclusive basis).
Id.
Conditioning the sale of a wanted product to the sale of another, unwanted product.
76 Fed. Reg. 62029-30 (Oct. 28, 2011).
Merlis, supra note 204.
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Monetary Penalty (CMP). 23 2 Stark, AKS, and CMP provision, addressing
inappropriate compensation arrangements and beneficiary inducement to
reduce or limit services, are vital tools used to protect patients and the
federal healthcare programs from fraud, improper referral payments,
unnecessary utilization, underutilization, and other questionable
practices. 23 3 There are five waivers in total that address the Medicare fraud
and abuse laws: (1) ACO pre-participation waiver; (2) ACO participation
waiver; (3) shared savings distributions waiver; (4) Stark compliance
waiver; and (5) a patient incentive waiver.234
The pre-participation waiver applies to ACO related start-up
arrangements in anticipation of participating in the Shared Savings
Program.2 35 This waiver waives the applicability of Stark, AKS, and CMP
to start-up arrangements that occur before an ACO officially starts
participating in the shared savings program. 236 ACOs must meet the
following criteria to qualify: (1) the arrangement must be undertaken with
a good faith intention to develop an ACO that will participate in the
Shared Savings Program in a target year and to submit a completed
application to participate for that year; (2) parties to the arrangement must
take diligent steps towards developing an eligible ACO; (3) the ACO
governing body must make and authorize a bona fide determination that
the arrangement is reasonably related to the purposes of the Shared
Savings Program; and (4) the ACOs must contemporaneously document
all efforts to satisfy the first three requirements. 23 7 The waiver would start
one year prior to the ACO application due date for the target year and end
on the start date of an ACO's participation agreement with CMS. 238
The ACO participation waiver waives the same fraud and abuse laws
for ACOs that: (1) entered into a participation agreement with CMS and
remain in good standing; (2) meet the governance, leadership, and
management requirements of the Shared Savings Program; (3) made and
authorized a bona fide determination that the agreement is reasonably
related to the provisions of the Shared Savings Program; (4) document the
arrangement and its authorization by the ACO governing body; and, (5)
publicly disclose the arrangement in a manner acceptable to CMS. 239 The
232.
233.
234.
235.
236.
237.
238.
239.

76 Fed. Reg. 67992 (Nov. 2, 2011).
Id. at 68008.
76 Fed. Reg. 67993 (Nov. 2, 2011).
Id
Id. at 68000.
Id
Id.
76 Fed. Reg. 67801 (November 2, 2011).
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waiver takes effect on the start date of the participation agreement with
CMS and ends six months after the expiration of the agreement (including
any renewals) or the voluntary termination of an ACO.240
The shared savings distribution waiver protects the distribution of
shared savings earned by the ACO to member participants or the use of the
savings towards activities reasonably related to the shared savings program
if the ACO has a signed agreement with CMS, remains in good standing,
and the savings were earned during the participation period. 241' The Stark
compliance waiver protects the ACO, its participants, and its
providers/suppliers from implicating AKS and CMP provisions if: (1) the
ACO has a signed participation agreement and is in good standing, (2) the
financial relationship is reasonably related to the purposes of the Shared
Savings Program, and (3) the financial relationship complies with an
existing Stark exception.2 42 The patient incentive waiver will not be
discussed in detail for the purposes of this article.
CMS has indicated that the shared savings distribution waiver applies
to activities or financial relationships "reasonably related to the purposes
of the Shared Savings Program." 24 3 It defines "purposes of Shared Savings
Program" as promoting accountability for the quality, cost, and overall
care for a Medicare population; managing and coordinating care for
Medicare beneficiaries through an ACO; and encouraging investments in
infrastructure and redesigned care processes. 2" To be reasonably related
to the purposes of the Shared Savings Program, an activity or arrangement
need only be reasonably related to one of the purposes of the Shared
Savings Program. 245 This departure from the "necessary for and directly
related to ACO purposes" language of the proposed rules is aimed at
making compliance with waiver requirements easier.246 This language
change is a significant relaxation of what constitutes a waived activity or
relationship. So long as anargument could be made that a particular

activity is reasonably related to the enumerated purposes of the Shared
Savings Program, it will be protected by the waivers. Additionally, the
Stark compliance waiver reduces the regulatory analysis ACO participants
need to conduct when engaging in activities that meet an existing Stark

240.
241.
242.
243.
244.
245.
246.

Id. (involuntary terminations result in the inunediate revocation of the waiver).
Id.
Id.
Id. at 68002.
Id.
Id.
76 Fed. Reg. 68002.
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exception.247 As it stands right now, satisfying a Stark exception does not
immunize conduct under the AKS; 248 providers have to satisfy both laws
independently to ensure compliance. CMS is deviating from this longstanding, restrictive rule. 249
Being amongst the first batch of ACOs has the advantage of getting
"grandfathered" in to the current waiver requirement.250 CMS indicated
that it will closely monitor ACOs entering the program between 20122013 (the first year of the Shared Savings Program) and, if need be, plan to
narrow the waivers for ACO applicants beyond 2013.25
Health law experts note that the final ACO waivers are a significant
departure from the requirements of existing fraud and abuse laws.252 For
example, in order to meet Stark Law exceptions, provider agreements must
be in writing, signed by the parties, and must be commercially reasonable
arrangements at fair market value. 253 None of the waivers, except the Stark
compliance waiver aimed at protecting existing Stark arrangements,
requires an arrangement to be at fair market value. 254 The waivers
themselves are immediately effective and self-implementing, which means
that ACOs, their member participants, and their providers/suppliers will
not need to apply to CMS or OIG to utilize a particular waiver.255
The protections afforded by the waivers are extensive and will permit
many relationships that are currently prohibited.2 " These waivers will
allow for larger EHR and connectivity donations from hospitals to ACO
participating physician as they are currently only subject to the Stark EHR
donation exception, which expires at the end of 2013."' Additionally,
hospitals could begin making compensation payments to physicians based
on reductions in patient length of stay, patient readmission, use of standard
low-cost supplies, and hospital efficiencies-such payments are currently
prohibited under the fraud and abuse laws. 258 The relaxed waivers could

247. 76 Fed. Reg. 68006 (November 2, 2011).
248. Id.
249. Id
250. Id. at 68008.
251. Id
252. , ACO Update: Overview of Final Waivers, HARRIS BEACH, PLLC (Nov. 22, 2011), at
www.harrisbeach.com/print/media-news/9196.
253. 42 C.F.R. § 411.357, etseq.
254. See 42 C.F.R. § 411.357; ACO Update, supra note 249.
255. Id.
256. ACOs Get Broad Waivers From the Fraud and Abuse Laws, McDERMOTT, WILL & EMERY (Nov. 10,
2011), at http://www.mwe.com/info/news/wpl 1la.pdf at 2.
257. Id. at 10.
258. Id.
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allow for compensation arrangements between ACO members, which are
likely to influence referral trends.259 If the data from the first batch of
ACOs shows rampant fraud and abuse, CMS will most likely modify the
waivers. However, the first batch of ACOs will be grandfathered into the
current waiver requirements and can take advantage of compensation
arrangements that may not be allowed after 2013.
Health Care Delivery Moving Toward a Pay For Quality Model
It is unequivocally true that subpar healthcare quality is a national
issue.260 Policymakers have recognized that the catalyst for healthcare
change is incentivizing the delivery of high-quality care at low costs. 261
Policymakers have recognized that the catalyst for healthcare change is
incentivizing the delivery of high-quality care at low costs. 262 Additionally,
CMS identified four criteria for implementing value-based purchasing of
healthcare: (1) developing quality/efficiency measures; (2) payment
system redesign through demonstration projects or statutory/regulatory
authority; (3) resources to develop and implement value-based purchasing
payment; and (4) developing data infrastructure.263 In large part, CMS has
followed through with its initiative to move healthcare in the direction of
value-based purchasing (pay for quality).
A cursory review of CMS initiatives shows that, as a society, we have
started down the path of value-based purchasing. Recent changes to the
Stark Law included an exception for donations of EHR and e-Prescribing
technology by hospitals to physicians. 2 " In 2009, The HITECH Act
provisions implemented an incentive program for physicians who engage
in the meaningful use of EHR."' The Physician Quality Reporting System
provides incentives to CMS-certified physicians who report on various
quality measures to CMS. 266 Over the last six years, these three major
incentive programs have been unveiled by CMS and emphasize the shift
toward value-based purchasing.
259. Id. at 7.
260. J. Frank Wharam & Daniel Sulmasy, Improving the Quality of Health Care: Who is Responsiblefor
What?, 301 no. 2 JAMA 215 (2009).
261. Department of Health and Human Services, Roadmap for Implementing Value Driven Health Care in
the Traditional Medicare Fee-for-Service Program, CENTERS FOR MEDICARE AND MEDICAID SERVICES, at

https://www.cms.gov/QualitylnitiativesGenlnfo/downloads/VBPRoadmapOEA_1-1 6508.pdf at 1.
262. Id.
263. HHS, supranote 259, at 4.
264. 42 C.F.R. § 411.357(v), (w).
265. 42 C.F.R. § 495.2.
266. Physician Quality Reporting Service Overview, Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services, at
https://www.cms.gov/PQRS/ (last modified Mar. 30, 2012).
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CMS initiatives are expected to substantially impact private payers as
well, 267 and in the area of ACOs, private payers have already started ACO
programs.2 68 Anthem Blue Cross and the Individual Practice Association
Medical Group of Santa Clara County (SCCIPA) started a private ACO in
California. 269 Anthem Blue Cross members will be included in the
program if they have received the majority of their medical care from the
participating physicians in the past.270 In 2010, the ACO reported over
$3.5 million in savings."' In Illinois, Advocate Physician Partners, a
physician-hospital organization representing approximately 3,500
physicians, signed its first ACO contract with Blue Cross Blue Shield,
which went into effect on January 1, 2011.272 The growth of private ACOs
can only be expected to continue, especially considering the federal
government's support of the ACO model.
SECTION 3: CONCLUSION
ACOs are here to stay. By incentivizing the reporting of quality
measures, infrastructure changes, and actual performance, the model is
capable of starting a revolution in healthcare delivery. The criticism that
the ACO model has received is greatly exaggerated. Critics have cited
burdensome reporting requirements, issues with internal ACO cooperation,
and external ACO impact as the reasons for their hesitation in supporting
the new CMS Shared Savings Program. However, after considering the
different structural models for ACOs, the multiple ways to divide profits,
the existing cooperation between physicians and local hospitals by way of
EHR technology, the reasonably tailored antitrust waiver, the favorable
fraud and abuse waivers, and the trend in healthcare policy, it becomes
increasingly clear that there is no need to wait. The ACO model of
healthcare delivery has received significant support from federal agencies
and has been implemented by a handful of private payers as well. Waiting
to participate in this revolutionary model will not result in additional
267. Stephen M. Weiner & Garrett G. Gillispie, CMS Proposes New Hospital Value-Based Purchasing
Program,
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benefits in fact waiting may result in potential ACOs' inability to take
advantage of current relaxed waivers. Healthcare providers should
consider the shift toward pay-for-quality delivery models, take advantage
of the favorable waivers, and dive head first into the ACO pool.

